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1. Introduction
This survey is concerned with the international interdependence and
coordination of the monetary policies of different economies under alter-
native exchange-rate regimes. The focus of attention and the interpretation
of the resulis will, as much as possible, be on the European economies. There
will be three exchange-rate regimes considered: (i) fixed exchange rates;
(ii) managed exchange rates; (iii) floating exchange rates.
A regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates is not that different from full
monetary union with a common currency unit. It implies that each central
bank has no control of its money supply, because it is very much determined
by the balancc of payments. In fact, under full employment (or under
indexation of the nominal wage to the cost-of-living index) monetary policy
is neutral and has no real effects. Hence, under such a long-run view, one can
focus on the international conflicts that arise from the observation that
domestic credit expansion leads to a bit more inflation Cor the whole region
and a balance-of-payments deficit. Section 2 focuses on these problems and,
in particular, on the coordination problems that arise when each central
bank cares about inflation and foreign reserves. Maintaining a long-run view
with a clearing labour market, Section 3 then discusses the potential for the
international coordination of monetary policies under tloating exchange
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rates. Of course, the main difference from Section 2 is that each central bank
can conduct its own monetary policy and can thus control its own inflation
rate. Section 3 focuses on two channels of transmission. The fírst one is a
public-finance view, which says that any change in monetary policy must be
accompanied by a change in distortionary taxes and therefore has real
effects. The second one relies on the interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect,
which argues that an increase in monetary growth reduces the world real
interest rate and therefore increases capital accumulation in all countries.
Section 4 considers the international coordination of monetary policy
under tloating exchange rates. and concentrates on the effects on the
exchange rates and on employment and output. Section S discusses the spill-
over effects under fixed exchange rates. Section 6 discusses the characteris-
tics of international coordination of a regime of managed exchange rates,
such as the European Monetary System. The idea is that Germany chooses its
money supply to maximize German welfare whilst the other countries of
Europe choose their optimal realignments of their currencies vis-à-vis the
Deutschmark to maximize their welfare. Section 7 presents a brief summary
of the results.
2. Fixed Exchange Rates, Full Employment and the
Problem of Inflation and the Balance of Payments
The first study to analyse issues of monetary policy coordination with the aid
of the monetary approach to the balance of payments was Hamada (1976).
This is a classic and serves as a useful example of how modern economic
theory approaches the problem of international policy coordination.
Under fixed nominal exchange rates monetary policies are closely inter-
dependent. This also occurs when exchange rates between the participating
countries are fixed (as they are for periods of time in the European Monetary
System), but when the central banks of the participating countries are not yet
completely unified. Even when there is full monetary union or one global
central bank (such as the proposed European Central Bank), it is of impor-
tance to know what incentives member countries have when they decide on
[heir monetary policies in a non-cooperative fashion and when they decide in
a cooperative of coordinated fashion. The monetary approach to the balance
of payments assumes full employment and purchasing power parity or com-
modity arbitrage. The latter assumption implies, under fixed exchangc rates,
that there is a common rate of inflation in all countries, say x. A surplus
(defici[) in the balance of payments occurs when the demand for money of
a country exceeds (falls short of) the domestic supply of money,
in; -(x; t y,) t z; where m, denotes the growth rate in the nominal money
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stock, y, denotes the growth rate in real income, x, denotes the difference
between domestic credit expansion and real growth, and z; denotes the
balance of payments as a ratio of the nominal money stock for the i-th
member state. The quantity theory gives the following condition for equil-
ibrium in the money market, in; - x- y, . The weighted sum of the balances
of payments, E;, w,t, where Ndenotes the number of inember states and w;
denotes the share of money demand for country r in world money demand,
must equal the increase in international reserves as a ratio of world money
demand, say GR. lt then follows that:
(i) There is a common or world rate of inflation ( x) given by the weighted
average of the excess growth rates in the supply of dor~r r~ ~.r~ait
expansion over the growth rates in real income in each of tii~ r~:cmber
states (x;) plus the increase in international reserves as a ratio of ihe
total world money supply (GR).
(ii) One country's surplus on the balance of payments must be another
country's deficit or, more precisely, the balance of payments of each
member state expressed as a ratio of its demand for money ( z,) is the
difference between the weighted average of excess supplies of
domestic credit of all member states together and its own excess
supply of domestic credit.
In algebraic terms, this can be summarized by:
N
~r - ~ W;x; f GR (2.1)
~.
z,-x-x„i-1,2,...,N. (2.2)
Hence, an expansion of domestic credit in one country leads to a deficit on
the balance of payments in that country, which is mirrored by surpluses on
the balance of payments in the other countries, and to higher inClation in all
countries. It is clear that the policies of each central bank affect the outcomes
in the other countries, so there are strong international spill-over effects. It
should be no surprise therefore that the setting of monetary policies is a
highly interdependent problem and has aspects of a game between the
various central banks.
National monetary policies are guided by cost-benefit calculations of the
monetary authorities. To be precise, the central bank of country i chooses its
domestic monetary policy (x,) to minimize its welfare-loss function, which
depends on inllation and the desired change in foreign reserves (i.e. the
balance of payments):
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Min W; ~ j(x - x')2 t 2 a,(Z, - Z")'. (2.3)~,
where x' and z,' denote the desired or bliss values of inflation and the balance
of payments and a, denotes the weight given to the balance-of-payments
target by country i. Non-cooperative (or Nash-Cournot) policies are
obtained when each central bank takes the policies of the other central bank
as given when deciding on its own optimal policy. Using (2.1)-(2.2) and
a W,iaX, - o, one obtains
w;(x - xd) - a~(1 - w~)(Z,- Z"). (2.4)
so that the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and the balance of
payments (w;I(l - w;)) is large for a large country. Also, smaller countries
have a stronger effect on their balance of payments than on inflation. When
a country wishes to reduce inflation. it sacrifices its balance-of-payments
target and thus incurs more surplus than is desirable (x 1 r' a z, 1 z').
Cooperative monetary policies are assumed to be the outcome of
international policy coordination. They follow from choosing jointly the
monetary policies of all central banks to maximize global welfare, say
minimize W~ Et,, Qt W,~, E,., ~4 - 1, (3t ~ 0 where S,~ denotes the index of
bargaining power for country k. Economists refer to such polícies as Pareto-
efficient outcomes when it is ensured that none of the countries is worse off
and at least one is better off. It is easy to show that the Pareto-efficient rate
of inflation corresponds to the desired rates of inflation ( r-~), because
summing the first-order conditions, aW~ax,- Et.,Qkw;[(r - x") f ar
(Zk - z; )] - I3;a,(z; - z,') - 0, i- 1, ... N yields r- r' immediately. Sum-
ming (2.4), one obtains for the non-cooperative outcome:
N
r- xd- ~a;(1 - w;)(Z,-Ze). (2.5)
i:
When the right-hand side of (2.5) is negative (positive), international reserves
and credit expansion are public goods (bads) and therefore give a defla-
tionary (inflationary) bias to the non-cooperative outcome, because each
central bank welcomes a higher (lower) growth in the world money supply
whilst it attempts to expand its own money supply at a slower (faster) rate
than the other central banks. It is now straightforward to establish the
following propositions (Hamada, 1976). The non-cooperative outcome gives
an inflation rate higher (lower) than the desired rate of inflation when the
increase in international reserves, GR, exceeds (falls short ot) the weighted
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average of desired increases in international reserves, E;, w;z'. The reason is
that, if x~ xe, then from (2.4) each country will have z, ~ z,' and thus
2;;' , w;z; - GR ~ E;, w;z". Hence, when there is an excessive (a too low)
expansion of world reserves, international policy coordination implies that
central banks reduce (increase) their rates ofexpansion in domestic credit. In
other words, when the expansion of international reserves is excessive,
countries defend themselves against reserve accumulation by expanding
domestic credit and thus increasing world inflation above the desired level.
Countries defend themselves by exporting inflation to abroad. The increase
in the size of the group of inember states works, as is well known from the
theory of public choice, against the optimal supply of public goods and thus
of credit expansion. Hence, when the number of countries increases, the
non-cooperative outcome diverges more from the cooperative outcome.
The design of a successful system of fixed nominal exchange rates must be
such that the non-cooperative or nationalistic outcome is not too different
from the outcome under international policy coordination. The main lesson
is that this requires one to manipulate the increase in international reserves in
such a way as to match the average preference for accumulating reserves by
the central banks. This requirement for success becomes more essential as
the number of inember states increases.
The results in this Section are most relevant for a system of irrevocably
fixed exchange rates as would be the case for a monetary union. The results
are less relevant for a regime of managed exchange rates, such as the
European Monetary System. because then the French, Italian, Belgium and
Dutch central banks are allowed to have periodic realignments of their
exchange rates (also see Section 6).
3. Floating Exchange Rates and Full Employment
In an international regime of floating exchange rates and, for ihe time being,
full employment in each member state, exchange rates adjust to clear the
balance of payments in each country (z, - 0) and therefore inflation in each
country (say, x;) is given by the excess rate of growth in domestic credit
expansion in that country (~r, - x,). It follows that each country can conduct
an independent monetary policy and choose its own, individual inflation
rate. The lack of international spill-over effects suggests that there is no big
role for international policy coordination, since inflation in each country is
simply set to its desired value (x,- x~ both under non-cooperative and
undcr cooperation policymaking.
However, the models considered so far ignore three essential features
of Western economies. The first feature is the public-finance aspect of
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monetary policy, the second feature is the effect of monetary policies on real
interest rates and capital accumulation, and the third feature is the effect of
monetary policy on real wages and unemployment. The first two features are
discussed in the remainder of this section. whilst the third feature is discussed
at some length in the next Section.
3.1. The Problem ol Distortlonary Taxes
Consider a system of interdependent monetary economies with floating
exchange rates, full employment. exogenous levels of government spending
and distortionary taxes on production income. It will be assumed that
increases (decreases) in monetary growth must be accompanied by decreases
(increases) in the tax rate in order for the government budget constraint to be
satisfied. This allows the public-finance aspects of monetary policy to be
discussed. For the time being. holdings of home and foreign bonds are
ignored. This may be reasonable when there are controls on international
capital movements. The demand for money is a decreasing function of the
expected inflation rate, since when inflation is expected to be high agents will
want to buy goods today rather than tomorrow. The first-best optimum for
the world economy can be characterized by:
(i) zero tax rates on production income in all economies;
(ii) the marginal rates of substitution between home and foreign con-
sumption of home, public and foreign goods must be unity;
(iii) the marginal utilities of money balances in each country must be zero
or, alternatively, Friedman's optimal quantity of money must prevail
in each country.
Unfortunately, [his first-best outcome can not be obtained in an inter-
national and interdependent system of decentralized market economies but it
serves as an appropriate benchmark.
A decrease in home monetary growth implies an increase in the home tax
rate, which reduces the opportunity cost of leisure and thus cuts the supply of
labour and goods. !t also dampens home consumption of home and foreign
goods. The resulting surplus on the current account of the balance of
payments induces an appreciation of the real exchange rate. which dampens
foreign consumption of home goods and therefore worsens foreign welfare.
Hence, a decrease in home monetary growth or an increase in home taxes is a
beggar-tlty-neighbour policy as far as welfare is concerned. (The effect on
home welfare is ambiguous, because home consumption Call whilst leisure
increases.) Given this international externality, it is straightforward to show
that (see van der Ploeg, 1988):
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(i) The non-cooperative outcomes are inefficient, because the negative
effects of higher taxes on foreign welfare are not internalized and
therefore tax rates and levels of government spending are too high in
the non-cooperative equilibrium.
(ii) International policy coordination would lead the governments of
each country to increase monetary growth rates, reduce tax rates and
reduce levels of government spending, which leads to higher con-
sumption of home and foreign goods, to lower seigniorage revenues
and to a level of real money balances below (rather than above as
under the non-cooperative equilibrium) Friedman's optimal quantity
of money.
(iii) Both the non-cooperative outcome and the outcome under inter-
national policy coordination are inefficient, because there are posi-
tive tax rates leading to real distortions, to deviations from
Friedman's optimal quantity of money, and to a too low provision of
public goods.
So far, the entire discussion has assumed that central banks have a
reputation with their private sector. The Appendix gives more detail and also
looks at the case where central banks cannot pre-commit themselves. Note
that under fixed exchange rates, the scope for raising seigniorage revenues is
much less and therefore the public-finance aspects of international policy
coordination become even more relevant.
3.2. The Problem oi Capital Accumulation
Let us now move on to the second feature associated with the effects of
monetary policy on the real interest rate and capital accumulation (see van
der Ploeg, 1987). Now consider an interdependent system of monetary
economies with floating exchange rates, full employment, exogenous levels
of government spending, perfect capital mobility, investment and capital
accumulation. Financial markets in the world economy are nowadays highly
integrated, which implies that international movements in bonds are highly
mobile. Hence, (risk-neutral) arbitrage between home and foreign assets
ensures that the real returns on home and foreign bonds are equalized in the
long run so that we can talk about a common world real interest rate. This
obscrvation leads to the interdependent Mundell-Tobin effect, that is an
increase in home monetary growth leads to a less than proportionate increase
in the home nominal interest rate and a fall in the world real interest rate and
thus to increases in investment and capital accumulation in each country.
Each central bank wishes on the one hand to cut monetary growth in order to
attain the inflation objective and on the other hand to increase monetary
98 Frederick van der Ploeg
growth in order to boost capital accumulation, employment and output. A
decrease in home monetary growth is again a beggar-thy-neighbour policy,
because it raises the world real interest rate and depresses activity and
therefore welfare in all foreígn countries whilst it dces not decrease foreign
inflation rates. It follows that the non-cooperative outcome leads to too low
levels of monetary growth and inflation throughout the world, to too high
levels of the world real interest rate, and to too low levcls ofemployment and
output throughout the world.
The lack of international poliey coordination leads to an international
stale-mate because none of the central banks wants to carry the full burden
of higher inflation associated with doing the public good of reducing the
world real interest rate and increasing world activity. The point is that the
cost of the charitable unilateral act of inereasing monetary growth leads to
inflation at home. whilst the rival countries get a'free' increase in capital,
employment and output as they do not experience an increase in inflation.
Note that this coordination problem is typical of an international regime of
floating exchange rates, because under fixed exchange rates there is a
common inflation rate throughout the world and therefore the costs as well
as the benefits of reducing the world real interest rate are shared by all of the
countries concerned. Hence. the aspects and problems of international
policy coordination originating from the effects of monetary policy on the
world real interest rate and capital accumulation are much less relevant
under fixed than under floating exchange rates. This could be considered as
an advantage of an international regime of fixed exchange rates.
4. Floating Exchange Rates and the Problem of
Unemployment
Let us now move on to the third feature of international coordination of
monetary policies under floating exchange rates, that is the effects of
monetary policy on wage formation and unemployment both at home and
abroad. This feature is obviously much more concerned with the short and
medium run and is, given the tremendous problem of unemployment facing
most Wes[ern economies at the present, a very pressing issue.
Ttiere are of course many causes of unemployment such as a lack of
effective aggregate demand, too high and rigid nominal wages, too high and
rigid real consumers' wages, too little productive capacity, too high tax
wedges, too much union power, an uncompetitive real exchange rate, etc.
We have already discussed in the previous section the effects of monetary
policy on the real intcrest rate and productive capacity and the consequent
need tor international policy coordination. Here we focus on the effects of
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monetary policy on aggregate demand and the real exchange rate. We will
assume that nominal wages are rigid and too high in the short run, even
though they can adjust in the long run to ensure that unemployment reaches
its natural rate. We could also have assumed that real wages are rigid and too
high in the short run, but in the absence of wealth effects monetary policy has
then no real effects as prices, wages and the nominal exchange rate change
proportionally and thus leave employment and output unaffected. However,
in a situation of real wage rigidity the international coordination of fiscal
policies is an important problem and is independent of the nature of the
exchange-rate regime in place (van der Ploeg, 1989).
To focus our ideas, consider a simple symmetric, two-country, monetary,
short-run model with floating exchange rates, immobility of labour, perfect
capital mobility and, tor simplicity, static expectations:
y--ártd(p'fe-p)tJtyy',O~y~l, (4.1)
y' -- àr' - ó(p' t e- p) t f' f yy, à~ 0, b 1 0, (4.2)
m-p-y-~r, (4.3)
m' - p' - y' -)`r', 1` ~ 0, (4.4)
r- r', (4.5)
p - w t r, (4.6)
p' - w' t T', (4.7)
wherey, f, r, p, e, w, m, and r denote real output, a fiscal shock, the interest
rate, the price level, the nominal exchange rate (price of foreign exchange in
terms of domestic currency), the exogenous (and rigid) nominal wage, the
exogenous money supply and the exogenous tax wedge respectively. All
variables are percentage derivations from their steady-state values, except
for r and r. Foreign variables are distinguished with an asterisk. Equations
(4.1) and ( 4.2) denote the home and foreign IS-curves and show that
aggregate demand is a decreasing function of the interest rate and an increas-
ing function of the real exchange rate, fiscal shocks and foreign income.
Equations ( 4.3) and ( 4.4) denote the home and foreign LM-curves, which
show that the real money supply must equal real money demand and that the
latter depends positively on income and negatively on the interest rate. It is
assumed that changes in the money supply are due to open market operations
and that additional government spending and tax cuts are financed by
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bonds. Equation (4.5) captures perfect capital mobility, so that returns on
home and foreign bonds are equalized. Finally, equations (4.6) and (4.7)
show that prices are a mark-up on wages inclusive of taxes.
Upon substitution of equation (4.6) into equation (4.3), one obtains the
aggregate supply (AS-) schedule:
y-m-w-rt)`r (4.8)
and similarly for the foreign country (see Figure 1). Hence, for a given
nominal wage, the AS-schedule slopes upwards as a higher interest rate
chokes off money demand and thus allows a higher level of income to restore
equilibrium in the money market. Alternatively, a higher interest rate
reduces the demand for money which exerts an upward pressure on prices,
erodes the real wage and boosts aggregate supply. An increase in the nominal
supply or a cut in taxes shifts the AS-schedule outwards. Combining (4.1)
and (4.2) together with (4.5) yields the aggregate demand (AD-) schedule:
y- -ortó(p'te-p)tjt7j' (4.9)
where a~ ó~(1 -ti), ó ~ óI(1 t y) and jII jI(1 -y'). Equating aggregate
demand, (4.9). with aggregate supply. (4.8), yields the goods market equi-
librium (GME) locus (see Figure 1) and similarly for the foreign country. The
GME-locus slopes upwards (arlaclcME - óI(a t),)), because a high interest
rate leads to a low level of aggregate demand and a high level of aggregate
supply of home goods which induces a fall in the relative of price of home
goods or a real appreciation of the home exchange rate.
Now consider a decrease in the home nominal money supply. This reduces
vy ~me~esi nw
Figure 1. Ellects ol a cut in the home nominalmoney supply !n a two-country model
with Iloating exchange rates and nominal wage rigidity.
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the aggregate supply of home goods, so that the AS-schedule shifts inwards
and the GME-locus shifts upwards (see Figure 1). The equilibrium shifts
from E to E'. Hence, the incipient excess demand for home goods is choked
off by a rise in the world interest rate. The resulting incipient excess supply of
foreign goods is choked off by a depreciation of the foreign real exchange
rate. The main point to notice, however, is that a monetary contraction is no
longer a beggar-thy-neighbour policy as in the previous section, but has a
negative effect on home employment and output and a positive effect on
foreign employment and output. This is accompanied by a fall in net exports
of the home country. Alternatively, one has the familiar Mundell-Fleming
result that a monelory expansion is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy asJaras
ernploymenl and output is concerned. The algebraic solution to the model







The central bank of each country conceivably wants on the one hand to
increase output whilst on the other hand it wants to increase the money
supply as little as possible for this leads in the long run to higher wages and




where y" denotes the full-employment value of output and 6 denotes the
weight attached to the price target. Initially there is too much unemployment
(ya - y~ ~ 0), which may be caused by a common adverse supply shock
( w f r- w' f r' c 0) or by an adverse demand shock at home or abroad
( j t j' e 0). This leads from (4.12) and a WIBrn - 0 to the following
reaction function for the home central bank:
rot'-~
m- ó( y" t á~m' ) I(ó~ t 9), á~ 1 a t~ . O C~ a],I(2a t]`) G 1.
` (4.14)
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Hence, more initial unemployment (a higher value of y") leads to a high
money supply. Also an increase in the foreign money supply leads to more
home unemployment and thus the home central bank reacts with an increase
in its money supply. Intersection of (4.14) with the foreign reaction curve
leads to the non-cooperative (or Nash-Cournot) outcome, say mN. The
cooperative outcome, say m~, follows from choosing m and m' to minimize
the global welfare loss, W t W', that is r3(W t W')I8m - r3(W t W' )~
8m' - 0. It is easily established that:
ya a
mN- `á2(1 a ~áI ~ mc- `á'(1 -~) t B(1 - ~)-' '
(4.15)
This leads to the following propositions for an international regime of
floating exchange rates and perCect capital mobility:
(i) The non-cooperative outcome leads to a too expansionary monetary
policy and thus to too low interest rates and to too high levels of
employment and output, because each central bank ignores the
adverse consequences of a high money supply on the other country.
(ii) International policy coordination would lead all countries to pay
more attention to their inflation objectives and thus to reduce their
money supplies.
Hence, in contrast to the longer-run aspects of international coordination of
monetary policies to do with public finance and with the global real interest
rate and capital accumulation discussed in the previous section, lack of inter-
national policy coordination implies a too expansionary (rather than a too
tight) monetary stance. Canzoneri and Gray (1985) use a similar welfare-loss
function and also find that the non-cooperative policies are too expan-
sionary. They also look at the case where one of the countries, say the US in
the era of floating exchange rates, adop[s a(Stackelberg) leadership position
vis-à-vis the rest of the world. This implies that the US minimizes its welfare
loss subject to the reaction functions of the rest of the world and therefore
the US restricts its money supply by more than the rest of the world. The
interesting feature is that a non-cooperative world with US hegemony
Pareto-dominates the non-cooperative (Nash-Cournot) world without US
hegemony. This suggests that altering the `rules of the game' may bc a partial
substitute for international policy coordination. (In fact, it can be shown
that the situation whcre the rest of the world fixes the exchange rate, i.e.
where the rest of the world chooses exactly the same money supply as the US,
is preferred to the US hegemony outcome by the US but not necessarily by
the rest of the world.)
In the 1970s inflation was a very important problem for policymakers in
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the Western world and, not surprisingly, many central banks engaged in
monetary disinflation. For example, the Medium Term Financial Strategy
adopted in the UK economy under Mrs Thatcher attempted to implement
gradual reductions in the UK monetary growth rate. Many studies have
analysed the potential for international coordination of monetary disinfla-
tion programmes (e.g. the papers by Oudiz and Sachs and by others in Buiter
and Marston, 1985). These studies have applied differential or difference
game theory to multiple-country versions of Dornbusch's (1976) famous
real-exchange-rate overshooting model, which extend the model discussed
earlier in this section by replacing the assumption of a rigid nominal wage by
an augmented Phillips curve, thereby ensuring that unemployment returns
to its natural rate in the long run, and by allowing for rational expectations in
the foreign-exchange and in other financial markets. In such models an
anticipated reduction in home monetary growth leads to an immediate
appreciation of the home real exchange rate, a fall in home employment and
output and an increase in foreign employment and output (reflecting the
locomotive aspect of a monetary contraction discussed earlier in this
Section). The policy problem of each central bank is that they start off with
full employment whilst they inherit a too high inflation rate, but that the dis-
inilation policy of cutting monetary growth leads to transient job tosses.
Typically, one finds that the absence of international policy coordination
leads to excessively fast disinflation in all countries. Such a finding may seem
counter-intuitive, because one would think that excessive disinflation is a
'public good' as far as employment and output is concerned and therefore
one would think that non-cooperation would lead to an under-supply of this
`public good.' However, such arguments ignore the fact that a cut in home
monetary growth leads to a depreciation of the foreign real exchange rate
and consequently to a higher consumers' price level, so that monetary con-
traction is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy and thus a'public bad' as far as the
inflation target is concerned.
This insight can best be explained and illustrated with the aid ofour simple
two-country model. Imagine that the welfare-loss function of the home
central bank is, instead of (4.13), given by:
Min Wa 2(y-y")2t~9(w-p~-"w)2, B,w~O, (4.13')~
where p~ denotes the (log of the) consumers' price level and m denotes the
desired (and positive) real consumers' wage. Hence, the central bank may
wish to increase the real consumers' wage or, alternatively, decrease inflation
in the consumers' price index as well as increase employment and output.
The consumers' price level is, under the assumption of Cobb-Douglas
preferences, a weighted average of home and foreign producers' prices:
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p~-(1 -a)pta(p'te)-ptac,0 ~ rY ~ 1, (4.16)
where a denotes the share of imports in total expenditures. [t follows that the
reduced form of equation (4.13') can be written as:
Min i(á(m-~m')-yaJrt2B(m'-m-w)~,
.
9 ~ ~ Boc ~~b~, w ~ (2bi:rla ) 1 0. (4.13 " )
!t is a straightforward exercise Co use the same arguments as before and show
that
mN - ~a t ~l
Iyd - (Br)~] C mc -
(a t ~lya~ (4.17)
a J ` o J
which leads to the following propositions for these more realistic welfare-
loss functions:
(i) The non-cooperative outcome leads to a too tight monetary
stance and thus to too much unemployment (yN - y" -(9~á)c., c y"),
because each central bank attempts to export inflation by appre-
ciating its exchange rate.
(ii) The outcome under international policy coordination realizes that
such competitive appreciations are futile and therefore leads to
a looser monetary policy which achieves full employment
(y~-y~ -y').
Note that this is exactly the reverse of the outcome when the nominal money
supply rather than real income or the cost-of-living index is the target
variable of each central bank. A similar result is obtained by Oudiz and
Sachs ( 1984) and by Canzoneri and Henderson (1987) and is discussed in
detail by McKibbin ( 1987). Roubini (1986) also gets that the Nash-Cournot
policies are too contractionary within the context of a three-country world
and also discusses asymmetric supply shocks. The main lesson that follows
from this discussion is that the nature of the bias in non-cooperative decision
making and the gains from international policy coordination depend
~rucially on the preferenccs of the various governments.
So far, this Section has always assumed that a monetary expansion is a
beggar-thy-neighbour policy wi[h respect to foreign output, which is
common in all analytical Mundell-Fleming models with nominal wage
rigidity, floating exchange rates and perfect capital mobility. However, some
argue nevertheless that a monetary expansion is a locomotive policy with
respect to foreign output (e.g. Minford, 1985). The reason is that we have
International Coordinafion ol Monetary Policies 105
bcen concerned with a bond-financed monetary expansion, i.e. the ccntral
banks purchase bonds from the private sector, whilst a monetary expansion
could also be associated with a looser fiscal stance, i.e. lower taxes or higher
government spending. Since a fiscal expansion is a locomotive policy (see
equation (4.12)), it is quite possible that in empirical work a monetary
expansion accompanied by a looser fiscal stance can be a locomotive rather
than a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Incidentally, this is exactly what was
found in the public-finance model discussed in Section 3.1.
The discussion of Sections 3 and 4 is more relevant for transatlantic than
for European coordination of monetary policies whilst Sections 2, 5 and 6
are more relevant for European policy coordination.
5. Fixed Exchange Rates and the Problem of
Unemployment
We pointed out in Section 2 that the need for international coordination of
monetary policies, as far as the effects on the real interest rate and capital
accumulation are concerned, are much less in a regime of fixed exchange
rates than in a regime of floating exchange rates, because none of the coun-
tries can isolate its inflation rate from the other inflation rates. This Section
is concerned with the short-run trade-offs and short-run international spill-
over effects of monetary policy in an interdependent world with perfect
capital mobility and unemployment caused by rigid nominal wages.
We will adapt the model developed in Section 4 to allow for fixed, rather
than for floating exchange rates. It is easy to show that a symmetric regime
of fixed exchange rates, e.g. a European Monetary Union automatically
sustains the cooperative outcome in the face of global supply shocks
(Roubini, 1986). In this sense, a symmetric regime of fixed exchange rates is a
substitute for international policy coordination. However, we assume that
the forcign central bank (say, the German Bundesbank), chooses its
monetary policy (m') whilst the home central bank (say, the Dutch, French
or Italian central bank) pegs its exchange rate to the foreign currency (e).
Such an asymmetric regime is in accordance with the view that the European
Monetary System operates as a greater Deutschmark-zone; for a discussion
of the evidence on this proposition see Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989).
Obviously, this means that the home money supply (m) has become an
endogenous variable. The mechanism is as fotlows. If there is pressure on the
home exchange rate to depreciate (et) arising from a balance-of-payments
dcficit, then the home central bank supplies home households with foreign
currcncy in exchange for home currency in order that home households can
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import the goods they want. !n other words, the home central bank defends
its exchange rate by buying up its own currency and selling foreign currency.
lt follows that a balance-of-payments deficit leads to an equal reduction in
the home money supply. Similarly. if there is pressure on the home exchange
rate to appreciate arising from a balance-of-payments surplus, then the
home central bank exchanges foreign currency for home currency, in order
to meet the need of home exporters and foreign importers, and this leads to
an increase in the home money supply. Hence, the main feature of a regime
of fixed exchange rates is that the central banks of Europe, other than the
Bundesbank, can no longer conduct an independent monetary policy. This
is the reason why the monetary policy conducted by the central bank of
the Netherlands is very much determined by the monetary policy of the
Bundesbank; it is almost impossible to conduct an independent monetary
and exchange rate policy. However, it is possible in the short run to s[erilize
the effects of the balance of payments on the money supply. For example, a
balance-of-payments surplus can be sterilized by an open market sale of
bonds to the private sector of equal magnitude so that the home money
supply is unaffected. Similarly, a balance-of-payments deficit can be
sterilized when the central bank purchases the right amount of bonds from
the private sector.
An international regime of fixed exchange rates, in the absence of steriliza-
tion policy, simply involves making the home money supply an endogenous
variable and the exchange rate an exogenous variable, so that equations
(4.10)-(4.12) can be rewritten in the following form (after a considerable
amount of algebra):
r-r'-[-be-m'ttiJtJ'tb(wtr)t(1 - b)(w'tr')JI(ot~) (5.1)
m-2betm't(1-y)(j-j')t(1-2b)(wtr-w'-r') (5.2)
Y-2áb(e- w-r) t [am't ((1 -ti)af )`)I-((1 -y)a-ry)`)I`
-((1 -2b)a-bl`)(w'tr')JI(atl~) (5.3)
y' -- 2á ~b(e - w - r) t[am' t~(y Jt J' )-( a t 7`b)(w' t r' )]I(o t)`).
(5.4)
An increase in the German money supply (m't) leads to an equal increase in
the French, Italian or Dutch money supply and thus to twice as large a fall in
the Europcan interest rate as would be the case under an international regime
of floating exchange rates. The reason for the increase in the non-German
money supply is that the non-German central banks are defending
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themselves against an appreciating currency by buying up foreign reserves
and selling their own currency. Since the fixed exchange rate implies that
there is no net effect on net exports arising from changes in relative prices, it
is clear that employment and output in Germany and the rest of Europe
increase due to the increase in consumption and investment arising from a
lower interest rate in Europe. This increase in output in each country is
smaller than the increase in output in Germany under floating exchange
rates, because the beneficial effects on net exports of depreciating exchange
rates do not occur under a regime of fixed exchange rates. The main point to
remember is that a German monetaryexpansion is, osJarasemployment and
output are concerned, a locomotive (rather than a beggar-thy-neighbour~
policy under a regime oJfrxed (ratherthan jloa[ingJ exchange rates.
Now consider the effects of a devaluation of the French, Italian or Dutch
currency (e t) vis-à-vis the Deutschmark. This leads to an improvement in net
exports of the rest of Europe to Germany and thus to an increase in non-
German employment and output and to a decrease in German employment
and output. To choke off the resulting excess supply of German money, the
European interest rate falls and as a result the non-German money demand
increases in line with the non-German money supply. Hence, as Jar as
employment and output is concerned, a devalua[ion ojthe French, Italian or
Dutch currency is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy. Since the world supply of
money increases, the European interest falls and thus the increase of output
in the rest of Europe exceeds the fall in German output and, similarly. the
non-European consumers' price level increases, by more than the German
consumers' price level falls. Hence, from equation (4.15) it is clear that non-
German consumers' prices increase as a result of a non-German devaluation
whilst German consumers' prices decrease. Hence, as far as the real-income
target is concerned, a revaluation of the French, Italian or Dutch currency is
a beggar-thy-neighbour policy.
6. Managed Exchange Rates, the EMS and the Problem
of Unemployment
Let us now consider a regime of managed exchange rates (also sometimes
called a reserve currency system), that is Germany chooses its money supply
to maximize its welfare whilst the rest of Europe chooses its exchange rate
vis-à-vis the Deutschmark to maximize their welfare. Alternatively, under
Bretton Woods the US might be viewed as determining world monetary
policy whilst the other countries in the world peg their exchange rates
vis-à-vis the dollar. Under the Gold standard there was a UK hegemony.
Such a regime may be more realistic than one would think at first sight even
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now, because since 1980 more than 140 countries seem to be classified by the
International Monetary Fund as pegging their currencies in some way or
another. Hence, a regime in which countries manage their exchange rates
may be more relevant in many circumstances than a regime of rigidly fixed
exchange rates or a regime of a`clean' float. It is also the case that an
asymmetric exchange-rate regime is quite realistic; particularly, in the light
of the 'N-1 problem' which says that not all the N countries can indepen-
dently control their exchange rates as only N-1 of them are independent
bilateral exchange rates (see Mundell, 1968). Until full monetary union is
achieved in Europe, the European Monetary System can be viewed as an
arrangement where exchange rates are neither floating nor irrevocably fixed
and where the European monetary stance is almost wholly determined by the
Bundesbank. Hence, this Section will be concerned with the European
Monetary System rather than with full monetary union in Europe. It will be
assumed that the Bundesbank has full control of the German money supply
and gives up any control of the intra-European exchange rates whilst the
other European central banks have full control of their exchange rates
vrs-d-vis the Deutschmark and give up any control of their money supplies.
We will also assume that the financial markets of Europe are highly
integrated, so that the rates of return on the bonds issued by the various
European governments must be equalized. Since the European Monetary
System is a system of managed exchange rates, speculative attacks on the
currency and balance-of-payments crises can occur whenever the private
sector expects a devaluation of the currency. Some of the European
countries, e.g. Italy and France, have used capital controls as a means of
avoiding such speculative attacks. This is the reason that perfect capital
mobility does not yet always hold in Europe, as can be witnessed from the
differential between off-shore and on-shore interest rates. It suggests that the
abolition of capital controls in Europe may not be feasible unless Europe
also moves to full monetary union with irrevocably fixed exchange rates. We
will abstract from such issues and thus assume that the European Monetary
System is characterized by perfect capital mobility.
We will assume that each central bank is concerned about unemployment
and real income (or the cost-of-living) in its own country. so that the welfare-
loss function (4.13') will be used. This implies from (4.13'), (4.16) and
(5.3)-(5.4) the following reduced-form welfare-loss functions:
r a
Min W- 2[2ábe t 1 a t~ m' -ya)2 f 29oc~[e t(wIa)]2 (6.1)
a
M~n W' - 2[- 2á~be t
a t)`
m~ -y']2 f 2é~~[e - (~ia)]2 (6.2)
International Coordination ol Monetary Policies 109
Note that the Bundesbank has lost control over the exchange'rate and has
therefore lost control over its real-income target. The reaction function for
the Bundesbank follows from aW'I am' - 0. it is upward-sloping and given
by
rn' -~a a~~ y" t~abl e. (6.3)
so that it reacts with a monetary expansion when the other central banks of
Europe attempt to devalue their currency and thereby cause German
employment and output losses (see Figure 2). The reaction function of the
non-German central banks follows from r3WI ae - 0 and are downward
sloping and given by
2ábly'- 1 a`'m' J -BaivL `o f M (6.4)
e- 4á2ó2tBa2
~
so that when the Bundesbank increases its money supply and thereby
increases non-German employment and output as well, the other central
bank can afford to pay more attention to their real-income target and thus




eN e (Guiider-Deulschemark rate)
Figure 2. Reaction lunclions in a world ol managed exchange rates.
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Figure 2). The non-cooperative (or Nash-Cournot) outcome, say eN and mN,
corresponds to the intersection of the reaction curves, (6.3) and (6.4) and is
given by (also see Figure 2):
eN- - `2b(Btá))w
G 0 (6.5)
o t ~ ~t7
mN - a ye - 2a(B fQ)I w. (6.6)
Upon substitution of (6.5)-(6.6) into (5.1)-(5.4), one obtains:
m 2be f m' -~a
t ~l r(2af ~~ 1 ~
N- N N- ` a J~- l2o(Btá)JwGmN
(6.7)
~N-rN- -(óeNfmN)I(at~)- -[y'tiB(Bfá)-!w]~a (6.8)
yN-y'-B(eta)-~w G ya (6.9)
YN- Y~ G YN . (6.10)
It follows that the resulting wetfare losses for the home and foreign country
are given by:
WN- 2 Bw2[(B tá~)~(B tá)2] ) 0 (6.11)
wN- 2 ew'[(ze tQ)i(e t Q)]2 ~ wN ~ o (6.IZ)
Before we move on to a discussion of the economic intuition behind these
results, we present the outcome under international policy coordination.
This outcome is obtained by stimultaneously choosing the German money
supply ( nr') and the exchinge rate (e) to maximize European welfare
(- W- 14" ) and leads to ec- 0, yc- y~- y',
(o t ~~




0 G WN G Wc- W~- Z Bw~ -? Bw~ G WN, (6.14)
where the subscript 'C' denotes the cooperative outcome.
International Coordination ol Monetary Policies 1 1 1
To aid the interpretation of the results, let us consider the effects of an
adverse common demand shock arising from a European programme of
fiscal deflation or, perhaps, from a fall in US demand for European pro-
ducts (say, J'-I'- d c 0). Without any adjustment in monetary policies, it
is clear from equations (5.3) and (5.4) that employment and output in both
countries fall by the same amount (8yI ad - 8y'I ad -~(1 t y)~(a t a) ) 0)
whilst real income in both countries remain unaffected. This means that, if
both countries start from a position of full employment, then a positive
target and a zero real-income target (y" 1 0, m- 0) are warranted. Similarly,
also consider the effects of an adverse common supply shock arising from,
for example, a common increase in the European tax wedge, a common dete-
rioration in productivity or an inerease in oil prices (T - T' - s~ O). It
follows that employment and output throughout Europe fall by the same
amount (ay~as - ay'IÓs -- aI(at),) e O) and that real incomes fall in the
same proportion (a(w - p~)I as - 8(w' - p~)Ias-- 1), so that both a
positive output target (ya-osl(at)`) ~ 0) and a positive real-income (or
cost-of-living) target (m - s~ 0) are warranted.
[t is now possible to summarize the results on coordination of monetary
policies within the European Monetary System with the following
propositions:
(i) Coordination of monetary policies within Europe leads each central
bank to attain full employment exactly, both under a floating and
undcr a managed intra-European exchange rate. !n both cases, this is
achieved with an equat increase in all European money supplies
leading to a fall in the European interest rate, whilst real incomes and
the intra-European exchange rates are unaffected. This holds for
common shocks in both demand and supply.
(ii) A common demand shock to all European countries leads under a
managed intra-European exchange rate and non-cooperation to
exactly the same outcomes as under cooperation within Europe.
(iii) A common adverse supply shock to all European economies leads,
under a managed intra-European exchange rate and non-cooperation,
to an appreciation of the lira, franc and guilder vis-à-vis the Deut-
schmark, even though the European economies have identical struc-
tures. Hence, the non-German economies use a real appreciation to
disinflate away the adverse consequences of the common supply
shock. This is achieved by the Dundesbank expanding its money
supply by more than the other European central banks. Germany
achieves full employment but does not score at all on its real-income
target, whereas the rest of Europe does not score so well on the
employment-target but achieves, with the aid ot an appreciation, also
on the real-income target. It can be shown that the rest of Europe
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achieves a smaller welfare loss than Germany, so that the exchange-
rate realignment allows the rest of Europe to reduce the damage to its
welCare at the expense of Germany. It is even the case that the rest of
Europe does better than under coordination, whilst Germany does
worse than under coordination.
The beggar-thy-neighbour policy of the rest of Europe, following a common
supply shock, works because it has complete control of the intra-European
exchange rate. The result under (iii) should be compared with the case of
floating exchange rates, discussed in Section 4(see equation (4.17)) and also
discussed in Canzoneri and Gray (1985), where both countries respond with
an excessive monetary contraction and Cutile attempts to export inflation
leaving the exchange rate nevertheless unaffected after an adverse supply
shock. ln fact, when there is no cooperation within Europe, the German
money supply is greater under a managed than under a floating intra-
European exchange rate. Also, note that cooperation within Europe leads
to fixed exchange rates and may therefore facilitate the move towards
European Monetary Union. However, intra-European exchange rates need
no longer remain fixed when European economies do not have identical
structural coefficients, even when the European economies coordinate their
monetary policies and are hit by identical shocks (see Basevi and Giavazzi,
1987). This suggests that the cor.~pletion ofa common European market may
be a prerequisite for full monetary union within Europe. Also, note that a
symmetric regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates (see Section 5) can
mimic the outcomes under international policy coordination because beggar-
thy-neighbour policies are ruled out by construction.
Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) obtain similar results to the ones discussed
so far with a model that does not have the real exchange rate affecting real
income and thus welfare, but that does have the real exchange rate affecting
aggregate supply through the usage of imported intermediate goods. They
show that, under non-cooperation, a managed intra-European exchange rate
and a country-specific demand shock, it is also possible for Germany to be
better, rather than worse. off than the rest of Europe. This result derives
from the negative spill-over efCects of exchange rate changes which in part
retieve Germany Crom the overcontractionloverexpansion bias in monetary
policy under non-cooperative decision making.
7. Concluding Remarks
We started in Section 2 with a regime of irrevocably fixed exchange rates,
which is applicable to an analysis of the international conflict over inflation
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and the balance of payments under the European Monetary System with
German hegemony or, much better, under European Monetary Union.
There is a common European inflation rate, which is a weighted average of
the European rates of domestic credit expansion (in excess of real growth),
and the balance-of-payments ratio for any country is the excess of inflation
over its rate of domestic credit expansion. In such a situation the non-
cooperative outcome gives a too high (low) European inflation rate when the
actual increase in international reserves exceeds (is below) the weighted
average of desired balance-of-payments ratios. Hence, an excessive growth
in international reserves means that countries defend themselves against
reserve accumulation by exporting inflation. The task ofa European Central
Bank, if it is ever established, is to ensure that the growth in European
Currency Units is such that the total growth in international reserves matches
the average desire for accumulating reserves by the central banks of the
various European countries.
With floating exchange rates. each country can isolate its inflation rate
and there is thus no need for international policy coordination on this
front. However, if cutting monetary growth must imply raising alternative
revenues from distortionary taxes, then Section 3. p. 97, showed that levels
of government spending are too high whilst monetary growth rates are too
low because higher taxes are a beggar-thy-neighbour policy as they reduce
imports and foreign welfare. Under a European Monetary Union the scope
for raising seigniorage revenues is much less, so that the international
coordination of distortionary taxes becomes an even more pressing issue.
Section 3, p. 97, continued with arguing that, under floating exchange rates,
an expansion of monetary growth leads to a fall in the world real interest rate
and a rise in capital accumulation, employment and output throughout the
world (the interdependent Mundell Tobin effect). Since inflation increases at
home and nowhere else, no country has a wish to carry the burden of
reducing the world interest rate and therefore absence of international policy
coordination implies a stale-mate in the sense that inflation. monetary
growth and activity are too low whilst real interest rates are too high. A
regirne of fixed exchange rates reduces these inefficiencies considerably,
because all countries share the burden as well as the benefits of an increase in
monetary growth and consequently there is much less need for international
policy coordination.
Section 4 focuses on floating exchange rates and the problems of nominal
wage rigidity and unemploymcnt. A monetary expansion is now a beggar-
thy-neighbour policy as far as employment and output are concerned, so that
monetary policy is in the absence of coordination too loose when preferences
depend on employment and the nominal money supply. However, when
preferences dcpend on employment and real income or the cost of living,
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monetary policy is too tight because a monetary contraction is a beggar-thy-
neighbour policy as far as real income and the cost of living are concerned.
In other words, international cooperation avoids the futile attempts at com-
petitive appreciations of the exchange rate. However, it is easy to show that a
European Monetary Union sustains the cooperative outcome and avoids
competitive appreciations (Roubini, 1986). Section S moves on to an
asymmetric regime of fixed intra-European exchange rates in Europe with a
German hegemony in monetary policy. This means that Germany fixes the
money supply whilst the other countries fix the intra-European exchange
rates. A German monetary expansion is a locomotive policy as far as
employment and output is concerned, whilst a devaluation of the non-
German currencies is a beggar-thy-neighbour policy as far as German
employment and output is concerned and reduces real incomes outside
Germany and increases German real income. Section 6 first shows that
international policy coordination under the European Monetary System
yields the same outcome as under floating exchange rates, that is full employ-
ment. A common adverse demand shock leads to the same outcome under
cooperation as under non-cooperation within the European Monetary
System, that is the European Monetary System avoids the need for inter-
national policy coordination in the face of demand shocks. A common
adverse supply shock leads under a non-cooperatively managed intra-
European exchange rate to a real appreciation of the lira, franc and guilder
versus the Deutschmark, even when the structures of the economies are
identical. Hence, the countries other than Germany use a real appreciation to
disinflate the adverse consequences of a supply shock and thereby achieve a
smaller welfare loss than Germany.
As far as related studies are concerned, Canzoneri and Gray (1985) argue
that the move from Bretton Woods to a managed tloat can be explained by
the recent tendency to have more wage indexation in Europe, the fact that oil
prices are fixed in dollars, and the oil-price hike caused by OPEC in 1973.
This suggests a fascinating line of research: which international regime is the
best substitute for international policy coordination. Kenen (1987) also starts
from the premise that international policy coordination is not perfect and
asks the question which exchange-rate regimes allow individual governments
to achievc their national objcctives without coordination. Kenen finds that
the outcome in a two-country portfolio-balance model depends on both the
nature and origin of the shock and on the prevailing exchange-rate regime,
but that fixed exchange rates Pareto-dominate floating exchange rates, in
that they obviate the need for international policy coordination, whílst
floating exchange rates never dominate a regime of fixed exchange rates (see
also McKibbin and Sachs (1986a, b) for such comparisons for Ciscal
policies). Kenen (1988) extends the analysis to allow for differences in size
and beliaviour between the two countries.
International Coordination ol Monetary Policies 1 15
As far as current research is concerned, there is a great deal of emphasis on
dynamics and, in particular, on how expectations and the credibility of
monetary policy affect the need for international coordination of monetary
policies. This requires the use of differential and~or difference game thcory
and a clear distinction between open-loop or pre-commitment outcomes,
obtained with the aid of Pontryagin's Mazimum Principle, and feedback,
credible or sub-game perfect outcomes, obtained with the aid of Bellman's
Method of Dynamic Programming (see the papers in Buiter and Marston
(1985) and in van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1989)). The most important point
is, as the Appendix argues, that, when central banks have no reputation with
the private sector, then international policy coordination destroys the
discipline of central banks and can thus be counterproductive (Rogoff, 1985;
van der Ploeg, 1988).
Appendix: Micro-foundations and Credibility Problems
Here we will argue that, in contrast to what many laymen think, inter-
national policy coordination can be counterproductive as it worsens the
credibility of the central banks vis-à-vis private sector agents. The point is
that, in a two-country world, there are really at least three players, namely
the central bank of the home country, the central bank of the foreign
country, and the private sector. lnternational coordination of monetary
policies implies a coalition between the two central banks, but this coalition
can provoke an adverse response from third players, i.e. the private sector.
In other words, a coalition among a sub-group of players can worsen the
game with the remaining players. Under floating exchange rates each central
bank has an incentive to announce a low money supply in order to persuade
the private sector to settle for low nominal wages, but once the private sector
is locked into such contracts the central bank has an incentive to renege and
implement a surprise increase in the money supply. Such a possibility to
renege should be excluded in equilibrium, unless central banks can tie their
own hands and pre-commit themselves, so that strategies of the central bank
should be credible and be believed by the private sector in the sense that they
must be rational to carry out if called upon to do so. !t is straightforward to
show that credible equilibria, relevant when central banks have no reputa-
tion or ability to pre-commit themselves, lead to higher monetary growth
and intlation rates. The point is that international policy coordination
destroys a discipline device and therefore gives central banks a greater incen-
tive to renege (Rogoff, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988). The reason is that, in the
absence of international policy coordination, a surprise inflation tax leads to
a depreciation of the currency and inflation costs which acts as a disincentive
to renege. The same point can be made with respect to fiscal policies (Kehoe,
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1986). However, a European Monetary Union with irrevocably fized intra-
European exchange rates avoids those credibility problems and this is
indeed, one of the main -attractions of such a system.
To illustrate the above discussion, we will discuss the desirability of inter-
national policy coordination with and without pre-commitment or reputa-
tion within the context of a classical model of two interdependent monetary
economies with micro foundations and a long-run trade-off between
inflation and output (cf. van der Ploeg, 1988; Sections 4.2 and 5.1). Micro-
foundations allow one to analyse the game-theoretic aspects in a much better
way. There are flexible prices, there is imperfect substitution between home
and foreign goods, and agents hold only domestic cash in their portfolios.
Labour is immobile. The government levies distortionary taxes on income
from production and also imposes `inflation taxes' in order to finance the
provision of public goods. The home households maximize their utility,
( exp (- bt)[a, logíCn) t a21og(C,,,) f o~rlog(1 - I') f a.log(G) t u(ll~)d~.
1o a, t~2 f o~~ t a~ - l, a~ 7 0, u'(m) ~ 0, (A.1)
subject to their budget constraint,
m-(1 -r)(wl'tz)- Co-eC,w-rM, (A.2)
where ó, Co, CM, I', G. M, r, w, z, e and x denote the pure rate of timc
preference, consumption of home goods, consumption of foreign goods,
labour supply, public spending, real money balances, the tax rate, the real
wage, profits, the exchange rate and the inflation rate, respectively. Applica-
tion of Pontryagin's Maximum Principle yields Co-er,~1,, CM-a2~e)`,
I' - l- a3~[(I - r)w~) and
)` - (b t r`))` t u'(M) (A.3)
where ], denotes the marginal value of money balances and x` denotes
expected inflation. Putting money in the utility function gives us a demand
for money, which is a negative function of inflation. There exists an M, say
MF, such that u'(M) - 0 and this will be called Friedman's optimal quantity
of money (OQM). Firms maximize profits, which gives the demand for
labour, !", from, f'(I')- w where f(.) is the production function. Labour
market equilibrium gives employment l- I- a~I[(1 - r)j''(!)),], which can
be solved to give !- L((1 - r)~), L' ) 0. Money market equilibrium gives
~- x t 1NI M, where ~ denotes the growth in the nominal money supply.
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The government budget constraint is given by ~M- d~ G- rf(!), where d
denotes the public sector deficit. The foreign economy has identical tastes
and preferences and the same population size. Foreign variables are denoted
with an asterisk. Goods market equilibrium is given by f(I) - Co t G t C,',,,
where C,',~ denotes exports. Exchange market equilibrium gives Cw - eCM , so
that e-)`I1`'. Finally, perfect foresight gives r` - r. The perfect-foresight
equilibrium (PFE) gives the endogenous variables conditional on expecta-
tions of current and future values of the government's policy instruments. In
particular, the demand for real money balances depends negatively on the
expected inflation rate, as in a Cagan-type money-demand schedule, and
therefore the price level is history-dependent and jumps in reaction to `news'
about future events. Hence, real money balances also change instanta-
neously in response to `news'. The objective of each government is to choose
its fiscal and monetary policies (r. G and ~) to maximize the utility of the
representative household subject to the constraints of the PFE.
Before we proceed to a discussion of the decentralized market outcomes
under non-cooperative central banks and under international policy coordi-
nation, we briefly discuss the first-best outcome of the world economy as this
gives an upper bound on the welfare that can be obtained in a system of
cooperative or non-cooperative interdependent market economies. The first-
best optimum for the world economy is characterized by (see also Section 3,
p. 96): (i) the marginal rate of substitution between home and foreign con-
sumption of home, public and foreign goods is unity (a, ICo - a2IC,~ -
or, IG- a, ICó - or2ICM - a~ IG' ); (ii) zero tax distortions (r - r' - 0); and
(iii) Friedman's Optimum Quantity of Money (M- M' - MF). The implied
monctary growth rate is ~- GIMf, so that the full liquidity rule of zero
nominal interest rates, i.e. ~c -- d, does not even hold in a first-best
op[imum for the world economy. For linear technologies, f(I)-Ql, one
obtains Co - Co - a, ~B, C,N - C,'N - az~, G- G' - a.(3, 1-!- 1-!' - a~ and
l~ - li' - aaQI Mf .
We now move back to the decentralized market outcomes associated with
the perfect-foresight equilibrium. We already mentioned the forward-
looking character of real money balances. This means that the central bank
or Treasury of each country can announce a change in policy at some future
event and, if believed by the private sector, then the private sector will
respond today. The credibility problems arising from these intertemporal
linkages give rise to a game between each government and private sector
agents. Therc is also a game between the home and foreign government
arising from the externalities induced by changes in foreign policy. An
increase in the foreign tax rate or foreign level of public spending leads to a
reduction in the foreign demand for home goods. The incipient trade deficit
is choked off by a depreciation of the home market exchange rate, which
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reduces home consumption of foreign goods and therefore worsens home
welfare ( also see Section 3.1). This is the externality facing home and foreign
governments.
Four market outcomes can be considered:
(i) Non-cooperation between home and foreign governments, but pre-
commitment or reputation vis-d-vis private sector agents.
(ii) International policy coordination and pre-commitment or reputation
vis-à-vis private sector agents.
(iii) Non-cooperation between home and foreign governments and lack of
credibility vis-à-vis private sector agents.
(iv) International policy coordination and lack of credibility vis-à-vis
private sector agents.
In outcome (i) governments do not cooperate in their choice of tax rates,
levels of government spending and monetary growth. Furthermore, each
government pre-commits itself to the announced policies for the future. This
pre-commitment can be done through constitutional law, institutional
constraints or the build-up of a reputation for `sticking to your guns'. In
other words, private sector agents believe the governments and act accord-
ingly. It can be easily shown that pre-commitment is required, because the
non-cooperative outcomes under (i) are time inconsistent as each govern-
ment has an incentive to cut distortionary taxes and increase monetary
growth and inflation in order to erode the real value of money balances and
thus increase welfare. The rationale behind this incentive to renege is that the
increase in seigniorage revenues permits a cut in distortionary taxes, leading
to more employment, and an increase in government spending, both of
which improve welfare. This time inconsistency arises despite the fact that
there is no conflict between private and public objectives! If there are no
binding contracts or reputational forces that prevent each government from
reneging on its private sector, expectations will not be fulfilled and the
government will soon lose its credibility. In that case, outcome (iii) becomes
relevant and the government has to treat its price level or, alternatively, its
shock of real money balances as a predetermined rather than as a jump vari-
able. Hence, this has been coined the non-cooperative, 'loss of leadership'
outcome as each government is resigned to the fact that it has no reputation
and cannot manipulate the holdings of real money balances. It is easily
shown that outcome (iii) leads to higher tax rates and the resulting distortions
in relative prices reduce the opportunity cost of leisure. so that labour supply
is less. Also, output and the consumption of home and foreign goods is less
than under outcome (i) (and thus aJortioriless than in the first-best outcome
for the world economy). The main feature of the non-cooperative outcome
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without pre-commitment or reputation, outcome (iii), is, however, that real
money balances are lower than under outcome (i), because then the gov~r-
ments will have no incentive to renege and impose a surprise inflation tax.
Clearly, outcome (iii) always yields lower welfare than the non-cooperative
outcome with pre-commitment (i).
Now consider outcome (ii). that is the outcome under international policy
coordination with pre-commitment or reputation vis-à-vis private sector
agents. The main difference with the non-cooperative outcome with pre-
commitment, (i), is that the negative externalities of higher taxes and public
spending on foreign welfare will be internalized, that is international policy
coordination leads to lower taxes and public spending than outcome ( i). It is
easily shown that international policy coordination still leads to the problem
oC time inconsistency, that is both governments have a joint incentive to
renege on private sector agents. In fact, there is a greater incentive to renege
than under the non-cooperative outcome, (i), and therefore an even greater
need to have binding contracts or reputation. The reason is that internationu!
policy coordination destroys lo a large eztent the monetary discipline oj
central banks. Non-cooperative policies have a built-in disincentive to
renege, i.e. discipline device, because a surprise levy of an inflation tax
immediately leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate and the asso-
ciated inflation reduces welfare and acts as a disincentive to renege. Inter-
national policy coordination no longer has this built-in disincentive to renege
on private sector agents, because when both governments impose a joint
surprise inflation tax the exchange rate is unaffected and the associated
discipline device is demolished. The above discussion explains why inter-
national policy coordination with central banks who lack credibility vis-à-vis
their private sector agents, i.e. outcome (iv), leads to excessive monetary
growth and inflation rates and thus to very low levels of real money balances;
low levels of monetary growth would simply not be believed by private sector
agents who fear a surprise inflation tax. The high inflation reduces welfare
and is the main reason why international policy coordination, when cen[ral
banks lack credibility with private sector agents, can be counterproductive.
Tlicre is an off-setting effect, which has to do with the fact that outcome (iv)
has no distortionary taxes (r - r' - 0) and that the provision of public goods
is Icss than in the non-cooperative outcome, (iii), (G~-G~-a~Q e GN).
Hence, the fiscal policy instruments in the cooperative outcome, (iv), are
exactly the same as in the first-best outcome for the world economy. Inter-
national policy coordination is counterproductive, when the adverse welfare
cffccts of excessive monetary growth and inflation (caused by lack of
credibility) outweigh the beneficial welfare effects of no tax distortions and
optimal provision of public goods.
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